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I. Introduction
"It's not the voting that's democracy, it's the counting...
Tom Stoppard, Jumpers1
"I am committed to helping Ohio deliver its electoral votes to the
president next year. "
Walden W. O'Dell, chief executive of Diebold, Inc.2
Walden W. O'Dell wrote what appears as a seemingly innocuous
platitude in a fund-raising letter in support of President George W.
Bush's 2004 re-election campaign, but this sentence has created a
firestorm of controversy that continues to make headlines across the
country.3 The uproar results from O'Dell's job as chief executive of
Diebold, Inc., a major manufacturer of touch-screen electronic voting
machines, otherwise known as Direct Recording Electronic devices
("DREs"). 4 Unlike traditional paper-ballot systems, O'Dell's
machines-and other manufacturer's machines like them-record
votes in secret, meaning that the voting public has no idea whether its
vote counted, and if it did count, whether it went to the person for
whom the voters voted. In its current implementation, this new
technology that lawmakers intended to correct the flaws in the 2000
Presidential election and restore legitimacy and trust to the electoral
system5 has produced just the opposite: a system open to fraud,
mistake, or error which could easily escalate into problems far worse
than Florida's hanging chads.
The source of this problem is the proprietary source code that
drives these paperless electronic voting machines. Unlike paper-based
voting machines, DREs operate entirely by computer, meaning that
at no stage of the election process can the public see the physical
counting of the votes. Absent access to the source code that runs the
DRE, the public has no way of knowing how-or if-the machine
records and tabulates votes. As a result, a growing chorus of critics
1. TOM STOPPARD, JUMPERS 35 (Grove Press New York, 1972).
2. Melanie Warner, Machine Politics in the Digital Age, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2003, at
§3, at 1 available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/09/business/yourmoney/O9vote.html.
3. See id. See also John Schwartz, Computer Voting Is Open to Easy Fraud, N.Y.
TIMES, July 24, 2003, at A16.
4. Warner, supra note 2. I will use these terms interchangeably.
5. 149 CONG. REc. S12673-4 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2003) (statement of Sen. Dodd)
[hereinafter Statement].
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claim that without the ability to scrutinize the process, the public has
no way to protect against malicious manufacturers, elections officials,
or voters from "hacking" the machines to "deliver" votes to their
chosen candidate.6
In practice, proprietary code-based DREs have proven to be
error-ridden and prone to security weaknesses because the closed
nature of the code has forced state agencies to protect manufacturers'
intellectual property7 at the expense of a reliable voting system. The
proprietary nature of the code requires a closed state review process
that has not eliminated serious errors and security flaws8 because it
limits the number of people testing the software.9 That closed process
also contradicts public policy and American tradition favoring
openness through transparent and accountable government.' ° As a
result, the electorate is forced to rely upon arguably substandard
machines to conduct one of the most important functions of our
democratic system.
Activists and legislators have seized upon adding a paper receipt
redundancy feature, or "voter-verified paper trail,"" as a solution to
6. See, e.g., Michael Ian Shamos, Electronic Voting - Evaluating the Threat, THIRD
CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER FREEDOM AND PRIVACY (March 1993), available at
http://www.cpsr.org/conferences/cfp93/shamos.html; Rebecca Mercuri, A Better Ballot
Box?: New Electronic Voting Systems Pose Risks as Well as Solutions, IEEE SPECTRUM,
Oct. 2002, at 46, available at http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/WEBONLY/
publicfeature/octO2/evot.html.
7. See, e.g., Md. Gen. Assemb. Dep't of Legis. Serv., Trusted Agent Report: Diebold
AccuVote-TS Voting System (Jan. 20, 2004), at
http://www.raba.comL/pressrrAReportAccuVote.pdf [hereinafter Trusted Agent Report].
Current elections codes require source code to be placed in escrow. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC.
CODE § 19103 (West 2004). I will utilize the California Election Code as an example of an
elections code. See also FEC 2 Voting Systems Performance and Test Standards §§ 2.1,
2.12-2.13 (Dec. 31, 2001), available at http://www.fec.gov/pages/vss/vss.html.
8. John Schwartz, Security Poor in Electronic Voting Machines, Study Warns, N.Y.
TIMES ONLINE (Jan. 29, 2004), at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/29/technology/29CND-
SECU.html. See also David Dill, Rebecca Mercuri, Peter Neumann, and Dan Wallach,
Frequently Asked Questions about DRE Voting Systems, VERIFIED VOTING, at
http://www.verifiedvoting.org/drefaq.asp (last visited Nov. 8,2003).
9. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 19206 (West 2004).
10. See, e.g., Cal. Secretary of State, 1 Procedures for Approving, Certifying,
Reviewing, Modifying, and Decertifying Voting Systems, Vote Tabulating Systems, Election
Observer Panel Plans, and Auxiliary Equipment, Materials and Procedures § 101 at
http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/vsp-procedures.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2004) ("In
furtherance of open elections at each phase of the automated process of tabulating ballots,
the Secretary of State requires that each election jurisdiction.., provide access to that
portion of the elections process.").
11. See Mercuri, supra note 6. See also Dill et. al., supra note 8, at §1. See also 149
CONG. REC. E1081-2 (daily ed. May 22, 2003) (statement of Rep. Holt) (introducing the
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the potential for rigged or flawed DREs. I will argue against the
paper trail solution, however, as it is (1) merely a "band-aid" for the
real problem of proprietary code, (2) is subject to the same potential
risks as existing paper-based voting systems, and (3) does nothing to
further the general goal of restoring legitimacy to voting.12 By
contrast, I will propose that states and the FEC mandate the use of
open source code to ensure transparency and accountability
mandated by law. In addition, states must eliminate escrow
requirements to allow for public testing of the source code, which will
further serve the policy goal of restoring trust and openness to the
election system.
This note was written and submitted for publication in advance
of the 2004 Presidential election in which DREs will face their most
important test. The timing of the submission was deliberately made in
the hope of avoiding being dismissed as a partisan post-election
lament, or serving as the basis for a challenge to a specific vote count.
Secure, reliable and fair elections are essential to American
democracy, and should be in the interest of the general public
independent of ideology or political affiliations. Transparent and
accountable voting systems are crucial in achieving that end because,
as the quote above from Tom Stoppard so wryly notes, vote counting
is ultimately more important than vote casting. This note is therefore
offered in the hope of contributing to the nonpartisan development of
such a voting system and restoring legitimacy to the American
electoral process.
H. Voting Systems and Open Source Code
A. Voting Systems
Currently five different kinds of ballot systems are used in the
United States: hand-counted paper ballots, mechanical lever
machines, computer punch-cards, optical scanners, and DREs. 3 Of
Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2003 which mandates the use of
voter-verified paper trails) [hereinafter Holt].
12. Statement, supra note 5, at S12673-4 (statement of Sen. Dodd).
13. Eric A. Fisher, Voting Technologies in the United States: Overview and Issues for
Congress, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS, R130773 at 1
(March 21, 2001) available at http://www.cnie.org/nle/crsreports/risk/rsk-55.cfm
[hereinafter Voting Technologies]. I am utilizing Congressional Research Service reports
throughout this note because they are neutral, comprehensive, and are used by
government in making decisions about voting systems.
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these five machines, all but DREs rely on paper. 4 The remaining
machines require the voter to mark the ballot with a pen, pencil, or
metal punch. 5
Although as of 2000 DREs only covered 10.7% of the
population, a significant increase in use is all but assured and will
probably occur in a very short period of time. 6 Use of DREs has
grown markedly in the past twenty years. 7 Furthermore, growth in
the use of DREs and optical scanners has come at the expense of
paper ballots and aging lever machines.18 In addition, the near-
Constitutional crisis brought about by the failure of punch-card
machines in the 2000 Presidential election has produced both federal
and state legislation financing their immediate replacement.'9 The
Help America Vote Act in particular has a 2006 deadline for the
purchase of this new equipment.20
States have turned to DREs because their unique touch-screen,
computer-based voting procedure offers both voters and government
a wide variety of benefits not found in any other voting technology.
For voters, DREs offer the possibility of providing a ballot in an
unlimited number of languages, multiple size type for the visually-
impaired, photos of the candidates, text-to-speech technology for the
blind, online "links" to a voter information packet, on-screen prompts
to avoid undervotes, and much more.2' Also, the flexibility of the user
14. THE CALTECH/MIT VOTING TECHNOLOGY PROJECT, RESIDUAL VOTES
ATTRIBUTABLE TO TECHNOLOGY: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE RELIABILITY OF EXISTING
VOTING EQUIPMENT, Version 2:3 (March 30, 2001) at http://www.hss.caltech.edu/
-voting/CalTechMITReportVersion2.pdf [hereinafter Residual Votes].
15. Id. at 2-3.
16. Id. at 5.
17. Id.
1& Id. See also Eric Lipton, Replacement Near, Old Vote Machines are New York
Issue, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2003), at Al available at
http://www.nytimes.comi2003/10/20/nyregion/20VOTE.html.
19. The "Help America Vote Act of 2002" [hereafter HAVA] authorized $650
million of federal money for the replacement of punch-card and other outdated voting
equipment. Pub. L. No. 107-252, §104(a) (codified as 42 U.S.C.S. § 15301). States followed
in kind by passing bond measures. See, e.g., The Voting Modernization Bond Act of 2002
(Shelley-Hertzberg Act) CAL. ELEC. CODE § 19230 (West 2003) (providing $200 million
in bonds to pay for new voting equipment).
20. Id. at § 301(d).
21. Voting Technologies, supra note 13, at 5; The Caltech/MIT Voting Technology
Project, Voting: What Is, What Could Be, 22, 25, 27, 59 (July 2001), at
http://www.vote.caltech.edu/Reports/2001report.html [hereafter The Caltech/MIT Voting
Technology Project]. There has been some concern about whether certain DREs make
access by the disabled more difficult. In particular, proposals for a paper trail have been
problematic for the visually-impaired. Recently, however, the U.S. Department of Justice
issued an opinion to California Secretary of State Kevin Shelley suggesting that that
20041
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interface on DREs allows for many different kinds of ballots and for
altering ballots to meet changing needs over time.2
For government, DREs mean the elimination of paper which can
become spoiled or altered.23 Paper ballots are also expensive and
difficult to print, store, and transport. 24 Furthermore, tabulation of the
election results without some level of computerization can be
extremely time-consuming and labor-intensive, often pushing costs
above those necessary for the purchase and maintenance of DREs. 5
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, electronic voting methods,
including DREs, have been viewed by government as a means to
encouraging voter turnout, particularly among young people who
tend not to vote.26 All of these factors mean that DREs are likely to
be purchased in great numbers in the next few years, making a
resolution about questions of their reliability extremely urgent.
B. Open Source Code
Source code is the set of instructions that govern the abilities of
computer software.2' A computer programmer writes the source code
in a programming language that bears some resemblance to English,
such as the popular C, C++, or Java.28 Once the source code is
completed, the programmer "compiles" the code, a process by which
the English-like programming language is translated into binary code
(consisting of ls and Os) that the computer hardware can
method would comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act. See OFF. LEGAL
COUNSEL, Whether Certain Direct Recording Electronic Voting Systems Comply With the
Help America Vote Act and the Americans With Disabilities Act, (Oct. 10, 2003) available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/drevotingsystems.htm.
22. Residual Votes, supra note 14, at 59.
23. CAL. SECRETARY OF STATE, SECRETARY OF STATE'S AD Hoc TOUCH SCREEN
REP. 15, (July 1, 2003), available at http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/elections vs.htm.
24. Residual Votes, supra note 14, at 20.
25. Voting Technologies, supra note 13, at 5-6.
26. Alternative Ballot Techniques: Hearing Before the House. Subcomm. on Elections
of the Comm on House Admin., 103rd Cong. (Sept. 22, 1994) (in which various state
officials and elections experts testified on test projects including a telephonic voting
system in New Mexico that produced higher turnout among young people). See also
Residual Votes, supra note 14, at 40. But see Mercuri, supra note 6, at 48 (suggesting that
"increased voter participation... for deploying Internet voting systems [is] ... relatively
insignificant," though citing only examples from the United Kingdom).
27. Medforms, Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Solutions, Inc., 290 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir.
2002) ("Source code is a mathematical set of instructions that a computer converts into an
executable program that can then be distributed and run by other computers.")
28. David S. Evans & Bernard J. Reddy, Government Preferences for Promoting
Open-Source Software: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH.
L. REv. 313,318 (2003).
understand. 29 After the source code is compiled, it becomes a software
program, such as a word processor, web browser, or flight simulator.
Once compiled, however, the source code cannot reliably be
decompiled, making access to the exact original source code
underlying the software program nearly impossible.0 A person with a
compiled software program on a computer can use its features
according to the abilities given to it by the source code, but that
person cannot figure out how the software program works." The
relationship is analogous to a person being able to drive an
automobile without being able to open up the hood, take apart the
engine, and determine how it makes the automobile operate. While a
software program can be decompiled, the process rarely produces an
exact copy of the original source code.32 Decompiling could give a
software programmer enough information about the original source
code to get a basic idea of how the program functions, but not enough
information to duplicate that function.33 The decompiled software
program might contain enough information, however, to inform a
hacker how to exploit security flaws in the program's design. '
4
Software developers utilize the inability to resurrect an exact
copy of the source code through decompiling to protect the
intellectual property within the source code, such as algorithms and
creative software design.35 Thus, unsurprisingly, commercial software
developers usually distribute only the compiled software program
unaccompanied by the source code as one of the primary protections
for their intellectual property and trade secrets. 6 Software distributed
without the source code is referred to as proprietary code.37 If a
software developer distributed the source code along with the
compiled software program, the recipient could easily recompile the
source code, put his or her name on it, and sell it as his or her own.
29. Id.
30. Id at 319.
31. Id. See also Eric Fisher, Election Reform and Electronic Voting Systems (DREs):
Analysis of Security Issues, 26, n.101 Congressional Research Service Report for Congress,
R132139, (Nov. 4, 2003), available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/voting/crsreport.pdf
[hereinafter Election Reform].
32 Election Reform, supra note 31, at 26, n.101.
33. Evans & Reddy, supra note 28, at 318.
34. Election Reform, supra note 31.
35. Evans & Reddy, supra note 28, at 319-20.
36. Id. at 320. Distributing compiled software programs without the source code is
used along with the more traditional legal intellectual property protections of copyright
and patent. Id.
37. Evans & Reddy, supra note 28, at 320.
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The computer end-user would be completely unaware that the source
code underlying a software program was not developed by the person
whose name appears on the software.
Despite the loss of intellectual property protection, many
software developers distribute their source code with the express
intent that others make use of that source code; software distributed
using this method is known as open source code. 8 Open source code-
based software may be distributed commercially or for free, and may
be copyrighted or more often explicitly not copyrighted. 9 More
importantly, open source code allows access to the precise
instructions for how the compiled software program will function,
meaning that a programmer can determine the methods the software
program uses to achieve its functionality. 40
Understanding how the software program operates has two
important implications. First, programmers can scrutinize the source
code to look for errors, poorly written code, or security weaknesses.41
In addition, programmers can improve the efficiency or design of the
source code or add additional features to those already existing in the
software.42 Second, if the source code is known to everyone, nefarious
programmers cannot use the closed nature of proprietary code to
include malicious code that would wreak havoc on a computer, and in
turn the important human activities that rely increasingly on
computers.43
3& Id. at 320-21. "Open source software refers to a computer program whose source
code is made available to the general public to be improved or modified as the user
wishes." Jeffrey W. Seifert, Computer Software and Open Source Issues: A Primer
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS, RL31627 at 1, (Nov. 5,
2001) available at http://www.ipmall.piercelaw.edu/hosted-resources/crs/RL31627.pdf.
39. Evans & Reddy, supra note 28, at 321-24. Open source software is typically
distributed under two kinds of licenses: BSD or GPL. Under the BSD license, a user may
modify, recompile, and distribute the source code, so long as the original copyright is
acknowledged. By contrast, under the GPL license, a user may likewise modify, recompile
and distribute the source code, but does not have to acknowledge a copyright, and more
importantly, cannot claim any copyright for the altered source code. The GPL license is
the more prevalent of the two schemes, and is used in the popular Linux operating system
to facilitate input from programmers interested in improving the system. See id.
40. Id. at 319.
41. Election Reform, supra note 31, at 26.
42. Seifert, supra note 38, at 1.
43. Trusted Agent Report, supra note 7, at 8. For contrary views, see Peter G.
Neuman, Security Criteria for Electronic Voting, 16th NATIONAL COMPUTER SECURITY
CONFERENCE BALTIMORE, MD., (Sept. 1993) available at
http://www.csl.sri.corn/-neumann/ncs93.html; Mercuri, supra note 6, at 48.
By contrast, proprietary code-based software programs operate
on the "security through obscurity" model which presumes that a
system is more secure the less anyone knows about it and its potential
weaknesses." Advocates argue that security through obscurity
"makes potential flaws more difficult to discover and therefore to
exploit." 45 Most security experts agree, however, that secret source
code as security is inherently fragile, because once exposed, the
damage is irreversible because the secret is known.4 In addition, to
remain secret, the proprietary code must be available to only a select
group of people, meaning that only a few programmers will scrutinize
the code for errors, as opposed to the potentially limitless group who
test open source code.47
When used in conjunction with electronic voting, open source
software can alleviate serious technical and security problems
inherent to the use of proprietary code that can compromise the
election process and cripple the system's legitimacy. In addition,
proprietary code undermines public policy and the American
tradition of transparent and accountable government. The next
section shall address these two concerns.
III. Proprietary Code Creates Obstacles to Electronic Voting
A. Proprietary Code Undermines Transparent and Accountable
Government
The public interest is protected "through having transparent and
accountable government," and "openness in government has always
been thought crucial to ensuring that the people remain in control of
their government." 49 Furthermore, the "right of the public to assure
itself that the election process is free, fair, and transparent, is likewise
of great public concern."5° Therefore elections, more than other
government-sponsored activities, require a heightened form of
transparency and accountability, to ensure the public their
fundamental right to vote. Proprietary code is inappropriate for
44. Election Reform, supra note 31, at 26.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
49. In re Sealed Case (Espy), 121 F.3d 729, 749 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
50. Chattanooga Publishing Co. v. Hamilton County Elec. Comm'n, 2003 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 767, at *9 (Knoxville 2003).
51. Weber v. Shelley, 347 F.3d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 2003).
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electronic voting because the closed nature of the code provides for
neither transparency nor accountability.
As evidenced above, problems associated with proprietary
source code are not unique to electronic voting; however, the election
environment creates important additional requirements. Unlike using
a word processor or playing video games, voting on a DRE (or any
voting machine) constitutes the exercise of a fundamental right.52
Furthermore, the public voting process acts to preserve all other
rights.53 Thus the legitimacy of the voting system has a direct
correlation to a voter's perception that government uphold all other
rights. A voting system operating in secret through proprietary code
that masks how a DRE records and counts votes is fundamentally
inappropriate to a public function of such vital importance. Indeed,
the public already has great experience with unreliable voting systems
and has seen how they can cause significant turmoil.55 Therefore,
elections heighten the need for transparency and accountability
beyond most other situations employing computer software.
Accountability for voting systems through traditional auditing
practices of following a paper trail cannot easily be achieved because
of the twin requirements of voter anonymity and the secrecy of the
actual vote. 6 Indeed, voter anonymity and secrecy are in fundamental
conflict with the audit process.57 To audit a voting system, there must
be a method to retrace the path from vote total to the original intent
of each voter. 58 Making that determination within the constraints of
ballot secrecy and voter anonymity is nearly impossible, and attempts
to do so often fail to produce satisfactory results.59 The most famous
example of this problem is the endless recounts of pregnant and
dimpled chads in Florida during the 2000 Presidential election. 60
Using proprietary code adds yet another constraint to election
52. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
53. Id
54. Statement, supra note 5, at S12673-4 (statement of Sen. Dodd).
55. See generally Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). See also The Caltech/MIT Voting
Technology Project, supra note 21, at 7-8.
56. Mercuri, supra note 6, at 46; Aviel D. Rubin, Tadayoshi Kohno, Adam
Stubblefield, and Dan S. Wallach, Analysis of an Electronic Voting System, 2 (July 23,
2003) at http://avirubin.com/vote.pdf (providing the first comprehensive independent
analysis of DRE code by computer scientists other than approved government officials or
contractors, or the developer).
57. Mercuri, supra note 6, at 46.
5& Id.
59. Id. See generally Bush, 531 U.S. 98.
60. The Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, supra note 21, at 17.
auditing by making it impossible to understand how the machine
recorded the vote and subsequently tabulated it.61 Without access to
the source code that runs the DRE, auditing becomes a pointless
endeavor because all an auditor has to work with is potentially flawed
election data produced by a black box in which it is impossible to see
how it created that data.62
Researchers at the Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, as
well as the Congressional Research Service and others, have
discussed creating redundancy by splitting the vote recording and
tabulating features into two machines through a variety of methods. 
6
By dividing the recording and tabulating functions into two separate
physical devices, the proposed systems would create data redundancy
to allow for audits.64 Even bifurcating the vote-recording and
tabulation processes into two machines would suffer from the same
problem since the proprietary code on the machine recording the vote
might contain malicious or error-ridden code. If the vote was not
correctly recorded, it cannot subsequently be properly counted. 
6
Thus the flaw remains the same.
Many have likened DREs to bank ATM machines that preserve
the secrecy of the customer's transaction through pin-codes and bank
cards, but ATMs are not subject to the same requirements of ballot
secrecy and voter anonymity. 66 Elections require a much higher level
of secrecy because unlike ATM machines that print out paper
receipts, election systems do not allow voters to take a copy of their
completed ballots home from the polls out of fear of coercion and
vote buying.67 Furthermore, unlike bank transactions where the bank
knows which customer made a withdrawal, voting systems demand
strict anonymity to prevent fraud.6 As a result, once the voter has
completed voting, the ballot cast by the voter can never be traced
back to the original voter.69
The inability to audit a proprietary code-based DRE creates a
further set of problems, most notably, a significant conflict of interest
61. See, e.g., Shamos, supra note 6.
62 Id
63. The Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, supra note 21, at 44; Election
Reform, supra note 31, at 20,27-31.
64. The Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, supra note 21, at 44.
65. Id.
66. Holt, supra note 11.
67. The Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, supra note 21, at 13.
68. Mercuri, supra note 6, at 46-47.
69. Election Reform, supra note 31, at 2.
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between those who manufacture the machines and the political
organizations to which they contribute campaign money.70 Proprietary
source code masks not only how DREs record and count votes, but
how the programmer intended the machine to record and count votes
through the inclusion of malicious code.71 While this possibility could
create a sinister symbiotic relationship between elected officials and
DRE manufacturers, an equally powerful countervailing incentive to
maintain honesty exists for no other reason than exposure risks losing
business in a very lucrative industry.72 Whether or not such
conspiracies exist, proprietary code creates the impression of
impropriety that casts a long shadow over the general goal of
restoring trust and legitimacy to the electoral system.73
B. States Are Unable to Regulate Proprietary Code
Proprietary code leaves to state elections agencies the task of
maintaining trust in electronic voting because they alone can conduct
testing and regulation of DREs.74 To protect manufacturers'
intellectual property, the proprietary code can only be released to a
select few expert testers, limited in number by statute and funding.75
As a result, very few people actually test the code for errors, thus
limiting the amount of scrutiny the code will receive.76 Furthermore,
without in-house experts to constantly test the numerous updates and
revisions to the source code, state officials can only conduct
occasional tests.77
The lack of in-house experts also means that state officials are
left with the task of regulating machines the officials themselves may
not understand. In addition, state agencies left largely on their own to
regulate the source code on the machines have found themselves
unable to keep up with the rapid pace of alterations to the source
code, leading to the use of uncertified software in some cases.78 While
70. Warner, supra note 2.
71. Election Reforn, supra note 31, at 2.
72 See generally Warner, supra note 2. See also Lipton, supra note 18.
73. Statement, supra note 5, at S12673-4 (statement of Sen. Dodd).
74. See, e.g., Weber, 347 F.3d at 1101.
75. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 19206 (West 2004) ("For the purpose of assistance
in examining a voting system the Secretary of State may employ not more than three
expert electronic technicians at a cost to be set by the Secretary of State.").
76. Election Reform, supra note 31, at 26.
77. See, e.g., Cal. Secretary of State, supra note 10, at Article 15 § 1501 (authorizing
biennial testing of electronic or computerized voting equipment).
78. Kim Zetter, California Halts E-Vote Certification, WIRED NEWS, (Nov. 3, 2003),
at http://www.wired.con/news/politics/0,1283,61068,00.html.
the use of uncertified software was eventually discovered after the
election, the mere fact that the DREs were running unapproved-and
potentially malicious-software suggests that state agencies, even
with the use of occasional expert testers, are not yet up to the task of
regulating DRE software on their own. The inability of state agencies
to regulate DRE software code became painfully evident when the
Ohio Secretary of State, faced with problematic source code on
already purchased machines, had no recourse but to ban DRE use
outright.7 9 Drastic remedies such as outright bans will of course
become unavailable once older machines have been discarded.
While time and experience will inevitably improve the ability of
state agencies to regulate DREs and manufacturers, states cannot
overcome the inherent structural limits imposed on testing
proprietary code by the need to protect intellectual property. State
agencies will never be able to have enough testers, to anticipate every
potential hacker's mode of attack, or to think of every potential
scenario that could cause error as compared to the limitless number
of potential testers in the public who could work through those
problems. Ultimately, the closed review procedure for proprietary
code will always dampen the public's trust.
C. Proprietary Code and Recounts
The hidden, non-tangible ballot and tabulation process created
by the proprietary code running in almost all DREss° in turn creates a
quandary when trying to make DREs comply with existing state
elections codes premised on the use of mechanical equipment and
paper ballots that the public can see. Specifically, current DREs make
impossible public inspection of the vote tally in a recount, as well as
the recount itself.8' For the purpose of this analysis, the California
Elections Code will be used as a model?
Recounts are premised on the idea that an error has occurred in
the tabulation of the vote as compared with the votes the voters
actually cast.?3 Ideally, to perform a recount, the voters would simply
be returned to the precinct and asked how they voted, but with
secrecy as an essential part of voting, such a recount would be
79. Press Release, Ohio Secretary of State, Blackwell Seeks Improvements and
Additional Security Assurances from Electronic Voting Machine Vendors (Dec. 2, 2003)
available at http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/news/release/12-02-03.htm.
80. Election Reform, supra note 31, at 26.
81. The Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, supra note 21, at 21.
82. CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 15360, 15627, 15629-30 (West 2004).
83. Election Refonn, supra note 31, at 8.
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impossible. 84 Therefore, current recounts are typically conducted by a
hand count of the physical paper ballots.Y In the case of voting
systems that use electronic tabulation, the ballots may be re-run
through the system to see if the system produces the same result.16
A manual hand-count is impossible if a voting system does not
have paper ballots, because there is nothing physical to count.87
Currently, the voter who demanded the recount may "select whether
the recount shall be conducted manually or by means of the voting
system used originally, or both." ' Without a physical ballot to inspect,
the voter demanding the recount has effectively lost the right to
choose a manual recount and must settle for re-running the data
through the voting system.
Re-running the data through the DRE will probably never
produce a different result from the original tally, however, because
there is little likelihood that the same software, when fed the same
data, will not produce the same resultY Unlike voting machines
counting paper ballots, paperless DREs have little chance of
mechanical error.9° Instead, DREs are vulnerable to malicious or
poorly-written software that might intentionally or unintentionally
fail to record the actual intent of the voter because the code itself
does not tabulate the votes correctly. 9' The purpose of recounts-to
thwart voting machine error-simply cannot be achieved by running
flawed data back through flawed software code. 92 The result will
always be the same: wrong.
The recount provisions in the Elections Code are violated if
"recounts" on DREs cannot be done by hand, and willnever reveal
mechanical error by re-running the data. DRE manufacturers argue
that election day summaries provide all the information necessary for
recount, but there is no evidence that such summaries would not be
affected by the same potentially flawed software that produced the
erroneous tallies. 93
84. Mercuri, supra note 6, at 46-47.
85. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 15627 (West 2004).
86. Id. See also Election Reform, supra note 31, at 8.
87. The CaltechIMIT Voting Technology Project, supra note 21, at 21, 45.
88. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 15627 (West 2004).
89. The CaltechIMIT Voting Technology Project, supra note 21, at 21.
90. Id. at 17.
91. Id. at 45.
92. Id.
93. Id.
More problematic are the random 1% manual election day
recounts required under the Elections Code, designed to catch
machine irregularities on election day to avoid requiring candidates
to pay for expensive and time-consuming recounts.9 This law cannot
be complied with as written because 95 manual recounts are impossible
on paperless DREs.9 Using the summary as the manual recount
device frustrates the language of the statute that provides for a
"public manual tally of the ballots tabulated by those devices,"
because the language contemplates the ballots and the device being
physically separate.97 If the ballot and the device are physically
separate, counting the ballots by hand, and using that result as a
check on the results tallied by the machine, creates an independent
check on the reliability of the voting machine. 9 On the other hand, if
the DRE generates the summary report, the lack of redundancy
renders the recount meaningless. 99 As a result, elections officials
cannot meet their obligations under the law, and the voters are not
provided the election day safeguard the legislature undoubtedly
intended to provide increased reliability to the vote.
IV. Open Source is the Best Solution
The serious potential problems with DREs are not inherent to
the machines, but to the proprietary code that runs them. The mere
act of opening the code to the public addresses the serious concerns
advanced by critics'00 by exposing the source of the problems these
machines have thus far experienced, which in turn creates the
transparency necessary to the election process. 1 Specifically, open
94. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 15360 (West 2004).
95. See discussion infra in this section.
96. The Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, supra note 21, at 21, 45.
97. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 15360 (West 2004).
98. The Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, supra note 21, at 45.
99. Id.
100. Critics have included computer scientists and activists. Computer scientists have
focused on the technical problems with DREs and have tried to use their expert analyses
to prompt state governments to reconsider using the machines without modification. See,
e.g., Neuman, supra note 43; Rubin, supra note 56. Activists, in addition to the technical
problems, have focused somewhat on what can only be termed the "conspiracy theory"
aspect of the debate. See Black Box Voting, at http://www.blackboxvoting.com (last
accessed Feb. 16, 2004).
101. DREs have experienced technical problems of varying degrees of severity in
almost every jurisdiction in which the machines are used in the United States. These
include California, Florida, Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, and Texas. See, e.g., Ian
Hoffnan, E-voting Runs into Bumps in East Bay, OAKLAND TRIBUNE, Nov. 5, 2003,
available at http://www.oaklandtribune.com/Stories/0,1413,82-1865-174577 9 ,00.html;
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source makes electronic voting transparent, more accountable, and
secure; allows for the possibility of "digital recounts;" and makes
elections more legitimate.
A. Open Source Makes Electronic Voting More Accountable and Secure
Switching to open source code enhances accountability and
security of elections by eliminating the secrecy fundamental to
proprietary code that operates in direct opposition to the "American
tradition" of "open elections. ' ' The openness of open source code
corresponds with the public requirements of voting by making the
process transparent and thus possible to audit, by not only
government officials, but the general public as well.' °3 In addition,
publicly available open source code would undergo the scrutiny of a
large number of testers, increasing the software's reliability and
relieving the burden on government.l°4
Unlike secret proprietary code, open source code running on
DREs could itself be directly audited, allowing the public as well as
any government official (not just those privy to material protected by
escrow provisions13') the ability to review the code recording and
tabulating votes.iO' If made public, DRE source code could, at least in
theory, be audited and tested by an infinite number of people an
infinite number of times, but would almost certainly be reviewed by
more people, more often than under laws restricting testing to a small
handful of outside experts' ° on a biennial basis.ln' Increased testing
would reduce the chances that the limited number of expert testers
would overlook errors or security weaknesses in the source code.1°9 In
addition, the risk that programmers might exploit the closed nature of
proprietary code to hide malicious instructions is diminished
somewhat by the number of eyes viewing the code.
Moreover, a public testing process would shift the burden of
actually conducting the tests away from state agencies. That way,
Salatheia Bryant and SK. Bardwell, White Pulls Ahead of Sanchez, HOUSTON CHRON.,
Nov. 4, 2003, available at http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/ssistory.mpl/topstory2/2200181;
David Cho, Fairfax Judge Orders Logs of Machines Inspected, WASHINGTON POST, Nov.
5,2003, at B01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A6291-2003Nov5.
102. United Steelworkers of America v. Sandlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 124 (1982).
103. Election Reform, supra note 31, at 26.
104. Id
105. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 19103 (West 2004).
106. Election Reform, supra note 31, at 26.
107. See id. See also CAL. ELEC. CODE § 19206 (West 2004).
108. See, e.g., Cal. Secretary of State, supra note 10, at Article 15 § 1501.
109. Election Reform, supra note 31, at 26.
state agencies could focus on managing and policing the process
which, as regulatory bodies, they are probably better designed to
handle. Furthermore, if government is not the sole tester of the
software, the hysteria surrounding electronic voting"' would probably
lessen. Results from one such review process bear out that claim. 1
Opening source code to the public also moves away from the
"security through obscurity" model that critics have charged violates
"[g]ood security principles [that] dictate that the analysis of a system
should presume that all components are publicly known... 2 This
fragile form of defense has already proven a problem when Diebold,
Inc. accidentally left the source code to one of its DREs on an
unprotected FTP site on the Internet.13 Although the leak allowed
computer security experts to analyze the code, 4 which led to eventual
improvements, the episode highlighted the weakness of security
through obscurity given that one simple error compromised the entire
security model. If the leak had occurred on the eve of an election, the
results might have been catastrophic given the myriad coding errors
and serious security flaws that numerous studies have discovered."5
Had Diebold made public its source code, many of the problems
computer security experts subsequently discovered would have been
eliminated in a more orderly review process. A review process would
have also avoided the negative national and international publicity
that Diebold-and electronic voting in general-garnered as a result
of the leak and discovery that the source code already used in DREs
was seriously flawed.1 6
110. See, e.g., Editorial, How to Hack an Election, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2004, at A16.
111. Kim Zetter, Aussies Do It Right: E-Voting, WIRED NEWS at
http://www.wired.com/news/ebiz/0,1272,61045,00.htm. The Australian Capital Territory's
open source paperless DRE voting system was designed without the level of criticism and
harsh debate found in the U.S. The design of the system involved an open review process
that solicited assistance from the public. See infra Part IV C.
112. Trusted Agent Report, supra note 7, at 8.
113. Election Reform, supra note 31, at 8-9.
114. See Rubin, supra note 56.
115. See id. See also Trusted Agent Report, supra note 7; Science Applications
International Corporation, Risk Assessment Report: Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting System
and Processes (redacted), SAIC-6099-2003-261, (Sept. 2, 2003), at
http://www.dbm.maryland.gov/catalog/opendoc.asp?UserID=2&ID=383171; Benjamin B.
Bederson and Paul S. Hermson, Usability Review of the Diebold DRE System for Four
Counties in the State of Maryland, at http://www.capc.umd.edu/rpts/MDEVoteMach.pdf
(last accessed March 5, 2004).
116. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 3. See also Andrew Gumble, All the President's
Votes?, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Oct. 14, 2003 at 2-4.
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B. Open Source Code Can Be Used to Conduct "Digital Recounts"
While open source code does not allow for traditional hand
recounts of paper ballots, the use of open source code, coupled with
effective enforcement of using properly certified software, obviates
the need for traditional hand counts. Since the ability to audit the
system is the purpose of recounts," 7 the hand-counting of paper is not
necessary to achieve that purpose if an alternative means produces a
relatively equally reliable result. Public availability of open source
code will significantly reduce the errors and malfunctioning inherent
in DREs to date." 8 In addition, the code used on a DRE in an
election can be compared to the publicly-available source code,
creating a publicly-available means of comparison as well as
compliance with state election codes requiring public recounts."'
While paperless open source DREs do not eradicate the
possibility of fraud or malicious software, "[t]he unfortunate reality is
that the possibility of electoral fraud can never be completely
eliminated, no matter which type of ballot is used."' Furthermore,
requiring paper ballots for all elections might stifle important
innovation, 12 such as increasing international interest in voting on the
Internet. 2 Moreover, paper does not make elections secure because
paper has been the source of a long and much lamented history of
ballot-stuffing, tampering, and other security woes in American
elections.'23
117. Weber, 347 F.3d at 1103.
11& Election Reform, supra note 31, at 22.
119. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 15629 (West 2004). While laws requiring the
recount process to be public also serve the purpose of placing a check on the fraud-prone
hand-counting process, that check could also in theory be provided by a judge or other
independent official. The public access to recounts provision in state elections codes
probably also serves the purpose of providing transparency, government accountability,
and legitimacy to the elections process by allowing direct public scrutiny over questionable
ballot tabulation.
120. Weber, 347 F.3d at 1106 (emphasis in original).
121. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 134.
122 See, e.g., Kevin Coleman, Internet Voting: Issues and Legislation, Congressional
Research Service Report for Congress, RS20639, (Jan. 16, 2001), at
http://www.cnie.org/nle/crsreports/government/gov-41.cfm; California Internet Voting
Task Force, A Report on the Feasibility of Internet Voting, (Jan. 2000) at
http://www.ss.ca.gov/executive/ivote/ivote-report.ZIP. See also Cybervote, Report on
Electronic Democracy Projects, Legal Issues of Internet Voting and Users (i.e. Voters and
Authorities Representatives) Requirements Analysis, (May 31, 2001), at
http://www.eucybervote.org/KISTA-WP2-D4V3-vl.0.pdf (recommending the European
Commission aggressively pursue Internet voting, voting over mobile phones, and other
new electronic voting techniques).
123. See Shamos, supra note 6.
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Fearful at the loss of traditional paper ballots, a significant
number of reformers, politicians, and pundits have seized upon
adding a "voter-verified paper trail" to existing DREs in an effort to
restore, in their minds, the ability to audit the system.24 The voter-
verified paper trail would add a printer to existing DREs, that upon
the conclusion of voting, would print a completed ballot that the voter
must "verify" before the electronic ballot is cast.' 2' Proponents believe
the paper print-outs create the ability to audit the system and increase
reliability because, in their minds, paper is more secure than
electronics.' 26 As a result of the controversy, proponents have
introduced legislation in Congress to amend HAVA to mandate the
use of paper in all voting machines77
Whether motivated by a genuine interest in improving the
electoral system, nalvet, or technophobia, proponents of the voter-
verified paper trail ignore their system's impracticality and flawed
reliance on paper. Indeed, when the challenge of electronic voting
required a complete shift in thinking for the digital age, far too many
could not resist looking backwards at paper, thinking that past
solutions could solve the fundamentally different problems posed by
computerization. Furthermore, many proponents tend to focus on the
visceral experience of voting without paper, rather than considering
how DREs avoid many of the problems associated with paper
ballots."" For instance, for all the fanfare associated with voter-
verified paper trails, only a few prototypes exist, and none have been
tested in an actual election where their use might create new security
problems and confusion for voters unaccustomed to the complexity of
ballot verification." In addition, adding a new physical component to
124. See Mercuri, supra note 6 (claiming that the author invented the idea such that it
should be termed "The Mercuri Method"). See also Dill et. al., supra note 8, at §1. The
voter-verified paper trail should not be confused with the voter-verified audit trail, a term
which describes any method by which the voter approves of the vote cast on a DRE
through some supplemental procedure. That procedure does not necessarily have to
include paper. See Election Reform, supra note 31, at 8.
125. Mercuri, supra note 6, at 47, 50 (including a diagram of how a voter-verified
paper trail might work).
126. See id. See also Kim Alexander, Why Trust New Paperless Voting (Nov. 10, 2002),
at http://www.calvoter.org/issues/votingtech/pub/1102KAoped.html.
127. Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2003, H.R. 2239, 108th
Cong. (2003) (notably, this bill would require the use of open source code in addition to a
voter-verified paper trail); Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2003, S.
1980, 108th Cong. (2003).
128 See, e.g., Holt, supra note 11, at E1081.
129. Election Reform, supra note 31, at 28.
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DREs increases the cost and potential for mechanical malfunction.' 3°
Moreover, the paper trail effectively eliminates electronic recounts in
favor of hand-recounts that would be exceedingly time-consuming
and potentially more error-prone.31
Voter-verified paper trails also create questionable compliance
with elections codes predicated on the use of a single ballot. The
addition of the voter-verified paper trail in essence creates a second
paper ballot to complement the electronic ballot, begging the
question of which one should be used to count the vote. The recount
provisions of the elections code are designed to facilitate a second
count of the ballot to compare to the result of electronic tabulation,
and do not designate which ballot-electronic or paper-should
predominate.132
The California Secretary of State decided that "whether it
includes a VVPAT [voter-verified paper audit trail] option or not,
that the electronic vote should be the legally valid vote unless there is
some sort of discrepancy between it and the permanent paper
record," but "the paper record should be presumed to be more
reliable than the electronic vote unless there is evidence it has been
corrupted or is incomplete."133 How the official record of the vote can
change is not contemplated within the current elections code.
Furthermore, allowing a secretary of state to arbitrarily change that
designation depending on various circumstances of his or her own
choosing seriously compromises the reliability of an election by
essentially allowing the secretary of state to choose which set of
results to prefer. Moreover, the secretary of state may invite countless
legal challenges to an election by defeated candidates by publicly
acknowledging that the electronic "legally valid vote" is officially less
reliable than the paper record.
Ultimately, considerable support for voter-verified paper trails
reflects a failure on the part of many officials to comprehend the
paradigm shift in thinking that must accompany the change from
paper ballots to paperless DREs. DREs can meet the demands of
accountability and transparency, while accomplishing the auditing
purpose of recounts, all through open source code without requiring a
backward-looking paper solution. Elections do not require the
needless formality of manual hand-recounts to achieve the purpose of
130. Id.
131. Id. at 29.
132. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 15630 (West 2004).
133. CAL. SECRETARY OF STATE, supra note 23, at 38.
a voting system: to count votes and allow for the collective democratic
expression of public opinion. If the voters believe DREs achieve this
purpose, as some studies suggest they do, 34 then the voter-verified
paper trail merely represents the attempts of an anxious mass
eschewing self-criticism to cling to the vestiges of an archaic tradition
that has no place in the digital age.
C. Open Source Makes Elections More Legitimate
Whether an election system succeeds or fails depends less on its
ability to provide slightly higher reliability and more on whether
voters perceive the system as legitimate. Open source code fosters
legitimacy by mirroring the open and participatory system of
democracy that elections are intended to facilitate. By allowing
anyone to download and inspect the software, the entire population,
either directly or through advocacy groups or the news media, could
help ensure the code is error-free and not subject to security
weaknesses.135 A testing group comprised of the entire voting public
would obviate the need for mass reliance upon a few expert testers,'
36
and would replace faith in them with faith in one's own inspection of
the source code, or that of independent organizations or the news
media.
Moreover, open source extends the concept of participatory
democracy to one of the most fundamental elements of participatory
democracy: voting. Like democracies themselves, the voting systems
used by the public would only be as good as the collective experience
and ability of the public to make that system trustworthy and
effective, rather than the individual abilities of a few outside experts.
Public involvement in the development and testing of the DRE
source code would, in turn, create public responsibility and
ownership, in both literal and figurative terms, over the source code
that facilitates elections. Public responsibility and ownership would
also eliminate the conflict of interest charges against manufacturers
trying to influence the outcome of an election through legal means.137
The world's first open source paperless DRE election in the
Australian Capital Territory ("ACT") produced positive reactions
134. See, e.g., Ann Allen, Georgians Express Confidence in New Electronic Voting
System, PEACH STATE POLL, (Feb. 27, 2003), at http://www.cviog.uga.edu/peachpoll/2003-
02.html.
135. See, e.g., Election Reform, supra note 31, at 26.
136. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 19206 (West 2004).
137. See, e.g., Warner, supra note 2.
20041 "BUT WE HAVE TO PROTECT OUR SOURCE!"
HASTINGS COMM/ENT LJ.
from voters, 8 suggesting that the negative press proprietary code-
based DREs have received in the United States could have been
avoided. Furthermore, the development process provides a model for
how American DRE manufacturers and state governments could use
a more open process based on open source code to enhance trust in
the resulting voting system. Unlike American DREs, the ACT chose
to run its system on open source software that was tested by a wide
variety of people within and outside of government, in a highly public
process."' The testing process resulted in the identification of
numerous errors, one of which would have seriously crippled the
system if left in place.14°
In addition, the design team solicited advice and feedback on the
system from representatives from the political parties, "special
interest groups," and advocacy organizations.141 Thus, unlike their
American counterparts who became opponents of paperless DREs,
these groups in Australia were directly a part of the transition to
electronic voting. By making these groups part of the development
process, the ACT not only avoided turning the groups into
opponents, but potentially gained public relations allies in efforts to
win over the public. From the public's perspective, a broad-based
coalition of groups developing the software negates the suggestion of
government conspiracy-or worse, incompetence-that has plagued
U.S. efforts.
D. Open Source Code Should Be Legalized
While opening the source code to the public would require very
little effort, under current elections codes doing so is essentially
"illegal." The Federal Elections Commission has promulgated, and
the states have adopted, escrow provisions to lock up in secret any
source code used to operate a voting system. 42 Coupled with the use
of compiled proprietary code, escrow provisions effectively lock the
public out from access to the source code that determines the votes
they cast. While these escrow provisions ostensibly act as part of the
discredited "security through obscurity" model,143 they ultimately
138. ACT Electoral Commission, The 2001 ACT Legislative Assembly Election;
Electronic Voting and Counting System Review, 10 (June 19, 2002) at
http://www.elections.act.gov.au/adobe/2001ElectionReviewComputerVoting.pdf.
139. Id. at 7-8.
140. Zetter, supra note 111.
141. ACT Electoral Commission, supra note 138, at 6-7.
142 See CAL. ELEC. CODE §19103 (West 2004). See also FEC, supra note 7.
143. See, e.g., Dill et. al., supra note 8, at § 2.2.
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exist to protect the intellectual property rights and investment costs of
proprietary source code developers.'"
Government may in many scenarios help companies protect their
intellectual property when their systems are used for a public
function, but in the case of elections, tipping the balance toward
private financial interests at the expense of public access places profit
ahead of democracy. 45 Requiring open source code for computers
performing all public functions might arguably stifle incentives for
private development in certain markets,'46 but that outcome is not
readily apparent with electronic voting machines. For instance, the
ACT put out bids for private companies to develop open source
voting software.1 47 In the United States, manufacturers make money
from selling electronic voting machines to state elections agencies, not
from the software in particular (although the Australian model
suggests that companies can make money on open source election
software). Moreover, many manufacturers rely heavily on commercial
off-the-shelf software for their voting machines, suggesting that very
little of the manufacturer's intellectual property is protected in
escrow.' Manufacturers could also make public the source code for
the recording and counting of the votes, while retaining proprietary
control over the user interface code 149 that is arguably more important
to a manufacturer in distinguishing their product from a competitor's.
V. Conclusion
With an important Presidential election hinging on vote results
from DREs, looming Federal and state voting equipment funding
deadlines, and increasing public pressure over DREs, government
must decide how to solve this problem in relatively short order. To do
so, it must cut through the conspiracy theories about election hackers
and focus on the true source of the problem with DREs: proprietary
source code. Proprietary code makes state agency testing of DRE
software inadequate to assure the system will be error-free and safe
from security flaws. In addition, the closed nature of proprietary code
does not comport with the American tradition of openness in
elections, based on transparent and accountable government.
144. See, e.g., Election Reform, supra note 31, at 26.
145. See discussion supra in Part I11A.
146. See generally Evans & Reddy, supra note 28.
147. ACT Electoral Commission, supra note 138, at 6.
14& Election Reform, supra note 31, at 26.
149. Id. at 27.
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Open source code provides a remedy to these problems by
soliciting the much larger number of testers in the public who can
leverage their combined knowledge and skills to create more reliable
DRE software. More importantly though, the public process of
testing and developing open source code gives the electorate
ownership and responsibility for creating a reliable system, which in
turn bolsters the resulting software's legitimacy by allowing the public
to affect its quality. In turn, that public review process will relieve
state agencies from the burden of being the sole testers of the code,
and allow them to focus on management and regulation of the review
process for which they are better suited.
Using open source code will undoubtedly solve the technical
problems with DRE software, and will probably restore the public's
faith in DREs, but it remains to be seen whether trust in the election
system as a whole can be repaired by electronic voting after the
disastrous 2000 Presidential election. Government must move quickly
to counteract the voluminous negative press electronic voting has
received. Moreover, even if open source software replaces
proprietary code, the process by which government changes to open
source may be just as important as using the open source code itself,
as the successful collaborative Australian model suggests. Ultimately,
if government is to succeed in its goal of restoring legitimacy to
election, the electronic voting machines it deploys in several suspect
Florida counties in November 2004 must perform flawlessly because
an anxious nation will be watching.
